Top Court sets aside order in criminal case saying Madras HC failed to appreciate that discretionary powers u/s 319 of CrPC ought to have been used sparingly
Justices Vikram Nath & Satish Chandra Sharma[23-02-2024]

Read Order: N. MANOGAR & ANR v. THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE & ORS [SC-SLP (Crl.) No(s). 8696 of 2021]

Tulip Kanth

New Delhi, February 23,2024:The Supreme Court has allowed an appeal against a Madras High Court order setting aside Trial Court’s decision of rejectingcomplainant’s application seeking summoning of appellants as accused persons. The Top Court opined that the Trial Court’sorder was well reasoned and did not suffer from any perversity.

Pursuant to an order of the High Court, Respondent No. 1 registered an FIRunder Section(s) 448, 294(b), 323 and 506(1) of the IPC pursuant to a complaint lodged by Respondent No. 2 i.e., the Complainant whereunder it was alleged that, Respondent No. 3 came to the Complainant’s home asking about one Vidhul i.e., the Complainant’s son. Upon being told that Viduhl was the Complainant son Respondent No. 3 slapped the Complainant, pushed her on the sofa, made vulgar comments and thereafter dragged Vidhul out of the bathroom and physically assaulted him up until he fell unconscious. Subsequently, Respondent No. 3 extended threats to the Complainant.

A chargesheet came to be filed before the Trial Court by Respondent No. 1 against Respondent No. 3 under Section(s) 294(b), 323, 506(1) and 448 IPC. Subsequently the charge under Section 448 IPC came to be altered to Section 452 IPC. Pertinently, the Complainant, other eyewitnesses and the doctor who examined the injured victims only named; and ascribed a role to Respondent No. 3 in their statement(s) under Section 161 CrPC before the investigating authorities.

An application under Section 482 CrPC came to be preferred by the Complainant before the High Court seeking re-investigation qua the FIR. At this stage, for first time, the Complainant individually Appellant No. 1 i.e., Respondent No. 3’s husband; and Appellant No. 2 i.e., a relative of Respondent No. 3; and ascribed a particular role qua the alleged incident to them. The High Court granted the Complainant liberty to prefer an application under Sections 319 read with 216 of the CrPC before the Trial Court seeking impleadment of the Appellants qua the proceedings emanating from the FIR. Further, the Trial Court was directed to consider the application of the Complainant under Sections 319 read with 216 of the CrPC and implead the Appellants as accused persons during the examination of witnesses.

Pursuant to the Re-Investigation Order, an application under Section319 read with 216 of the CrPC came to be preferred by the Complainant before the Trial Court. The Trial Court partly allowed the aforesaid application i.e., impleaded Appellant No. 1 as an accused person in the proceedings emanating from the FIR. Thereafter, revision petitions came to be allowed by the High Court on the ground that the Appellants were not issued notice in the Underlying Application and accordingly, the Underlying Application could not be decided without affording the Appellants an opportunity of hearing.

Aggrieved by the Underlying Order, the Complainant filed a criminal revision petition before the High Court. The High Court directed the Trial Court to implead the Appellants as Accused No. 2 and Accused No. 3 respectively in the Underlying Proceedings.

The appellants submitted that the High Court exercised jurisdiction under Section 319 of the CrPC and erroneously reversed the Trial Court Order without appreciatingthat the allegation qua the Appellants were vague, there was no evidence on record to suggest the involvement of the Appellants in the alleged offence.

The Division Bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma placed reliance upon Hardeep Singh v State of Punjab & Ors., [LQ/SC/2014/37]wherein it has been opined that the power u/s 319 Code of Criminal Procedure is a discretionary and an extraordinary power. It is to be exercised sparingly and only in those cases where the circumstances of the case so warrant. It is not to be exercised because the magistrate or the sessions judge is of the opinion that some other person may also be guilty of committing that offence. Only where strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence laid before the court that such power should be exercised and not in a casual and cavalier manner.

It was also observed therein that the test that has to be applied is one which is more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction. In the absence of such satisfaction, the court should refrain from exercising power under Section 319 Code of Criminal Procedure.

The Bench noted that the High Court had overturned the Trial Court’s Orderand accordingly impleaded the Appellants as accused persons in the Underlying Proceedings on the satisfaction of a prima-facie finding that the materials on record i.e., vague allegations emanating from the underlying complaint; the Complainants statement under Section 161 of the CrPC; and the complainant’s examination-in-chief, were sufficient to proceed against the Appellants.

According to the Top Court, the approach adopted by the High Court was not in consonance with this Court’s opinion in Hardeep Singh (Supra).

“The High Court failed to appreciate that the discretionary powers under Section 319 of the CrPC ought to have been used sparingly where circumstances of the case so warrant. In the present case, the Trial Court Order was well reasoned and did not suffer from any perversity. Moreover, the materials on record could not be said to have satisfied the threshold envisaged under Hardeep Singh (Supra) i.e., more than a prima facie case, as exercised at the time of framing of charge but short of evidence that if left unrebutted would lead to conviction”, the Bench held.

Thus, allowing the appeal, the Bench set aside the Impugned Order.