Read More: West Bengal Pharmacy Council v Rusha Podder
Simran Singh
New Delhi, May 26, 2023: By way of an intra court appeal, the Division Bench of the Madras High Court delivered a split verdict pertaining to the matter of where the West Bengal Pharmacy Council (authority) had questioned the correctness of the order dated 28-02-2023 in a writ filed by the respondents praying for:
- issuance of writ of mandamus to direct the appellants-authorities to forthwith grant a hearing of the objections raised by them vide email dated 01-01-2023
- issue a writ of prohibition to restrain the appellant-authority from sending election papers to the electors on 09-01-2023 and 10-01-2023
- issuance of a writ of certiorari to quash the notice dated 20-12-2022 by which the appellant council published the list of accepted or rejected candidates for the election to the West Bengal Pharmacy Council.
While the Chief Justice T.S. Sivagnanam affirmed the impugned order and was of the view that that entire election process thus far conducted was directed to be scrapped off, he also directed that the correctness of all the rejected nominations were to be considered in accordance with Rules of Rule 5(1) of the Rules for The Election of Members including the President and The Vice-President of the West Bengal Pharmacy Council and of the Members of the Executive Committee of the s[1] aid Council (Election Rules).
However, Justice Hiranmay Bhattacharya set aside the impugned order and stated that the writ court should not have embarked upon an enquiry into the reasons for rejection of nomination papers as the objection did not fall within the parameters of Rule 5(1) of the Election Rules.
Factual Matrix
In the mater at hand, on the date of the scrutiny, the respondents were not informed as to the reasons for rejection, therefore, they sent e-mail on 19-12-2022 at about 4 P.M. wherein they requested for reasons of rejection of their nomination within 24 hours. The respondents had sent another e-mail on 01-012023 stating that the reason for cancellation of their nominations was in non-compliance in respect of professional address and non-compliance of date of birth with the submitted documents since the list of documents required relating to the same had not been mentioned anywhere in Form C and all of them had already been submitted at the time of registration and therefore, it was incorrect to reject their nominations and requested that their nominations may be accepted. Since the respondents were not favoured with any reply, they had filed the said writ petition.
The impugned order stated that the rejection of the nomination of the respondents were flawed and directed the appellants-authorities to reconsider the nominations in accordance with Rule 5(1) of the Election Rules. The appellants-authorities were further directed to give effect to the final list or notice published on 20-12-2022 only after the direction was complied with. Further it was observed that since the last election of the council was held in 2007 and the tenure of office had expired in 2013, no prejudice was caused if the question of the respondents candidatures was decided within the time directed. The appellant-authorities being aggrieved by the said order had preferred the present appeal.
Issue for consideration
- Whether the rejection of the nomination of the respondents was in accordance with the Rule 5 of the Election Rules.
- Whether the impugned judgment was justified in allowing the objections against the order of rejection of nomination papers in an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
Chief Justice T.S. Sivagnanam noted that Rule 5 of the Election Rules stated that on the date and the time as fixed for the scrutiny of nominations vide notification under Rule 2, the Returning Officer would scrutinise all the nomination papers strictly with reference to the final electoral roll and decide which of them were in order and which were not. Nomination papers which did not comply with the requirements of Rule 3 would be rejected. If there were any objection by any candidate to the decision of the Returning Officer, it must be made forthwith, and the objection would be heard by the Returning Officer and two Members of the Council, not being candidates for the election, appointed by the President and their decision thereon would be final.
Upon perusing the notification issued by the first appellant dated 20-12-2022, the Chief Justice noted that the reason for rejection of the nomination of the respondent was nonspeaking. Thus, the Court had a serious doubt as to whether the enmass rejection of 25 nominations, including the respondent’s, was apparently for certain other reasons which were best known to the people in the helm of affairs of the appellants-authority. The Bench was surprised to note that out of 35 nominations which were filed, 25 nominations had been rejected and only 10 nominations were stated to be valid.
“This trend is very anomalous and rather surprising casting a cloud on the entire process of election adopted by the appellants. I am conscious of the fact that there are several decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court which hold that once an election process has commenced, the same shall not be interdicted. At the same time when glaring irregularities and illegalities are pointed out, should the Court shut its eyes to reality and refuse to grant any indulgence to the aggrieved.”
Chief Justice Sivagnanam dealt with the issue of maintainability while referring to Election Commission of India v. Ashok Kumar which had considered whether there was any conflict between the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution and the embargo created by Article 329 and if so, how would they co-exist. The Bench was of the view that there was no absolute bar for entertaining a writ petition when exceptional and extraordinary circumstances existed which will justify the Court exercising power under Article 226 to bypass alternate remedies. “If the monstrosity of the situation or other exceptional circumstance cries for timely jurisdictional interdict or mandate, the Court should not hesitate to exercise its extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution.” The Bench was of the view the respondents were fully justified in approaching the Writ Court.
Chief Justice Sivagnanam noted that when the election notice was published on 12-12-2022, the schedule of the election had been mentioned however, the publication of the list of valid nominations had not been specifically mentioned and no date and time had been notified. Further, the date on which the list of valid nomination would be published had not been mentioned in the notification which appeared to be a very serious lacuna.
Chief Justice stated that on the date of scrutiny of nomination i.e. on 19-12-2022, it was clear that some of the respondents were present but it was not in dispute that the reason for rejection of the nomination was not disclosed to the respondents or to the other 21 candidates whose nominations had been rejected. “The grievance redressal mechanism under Rule 5(1) of the Election Rules was not an empty formality. The word ‘immediate’ occurring in Sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 had to be given an interpretation based on the facts and circumstances. If the candidate whose nomination had been rejected and had not been put on notice as to the reasons for rejection could not be called upon to file their objection immediately because the person aggrieved had not been intimated as to on what grounds his nomination was rejected.”
That apart, Chief Justice Sivagnanam further noted that the Rule also stated that the objections would be heard by the Returning Officer with two Members of the Council not being candidates for election appointed by the President and their decision would be final. Thus, the Rule contemplated an opportunity of being heard, and that too in person. Thus, it was evidently clear that the people at the helm of affairs of the first appellant and the second appellant had abused their powers vested with them.
Chief Justice in fact stated that it was not clear as to how the persons whose terms of office had expired in the year 2013 continued to claim himself as President and members of the Council and in spite of the process being lingering so long, the State Government had not taken any action to remedy the situation.
Chief Justice Sivagnanam opined that the nomination was in accordance with Form C thus, there could be no ground to reject such a nomination and the reasons set out for rejection of the nomination of the respondents were clearly outside the scope of the requirements. Thus, the Court affirmed the impugned order which had allowed the writ petition and had directed the objection raised by the respondents to be considered by the Committee which was to be constituted in terms of Rule 5(1) of the Election Rules.
Chief Justice Sivagnanam was of the view that the entire election process thus far conducted, was required to be scrapped. Thus, the election process needed to be pushed back to the said date and the objections of the respondents as well as the other 21 candidates whose nominations were rejected had to be considered by the 3 Member committee.
Justice Hiranmay Bhattacharya disagreed with the reasons and the conclusion arrived at by the Chief Justice and stated that the Pharmacy Act, 1948 (Pharmacy Act) provided for a proper mechanism where any dispute arose regarding any such election, the same would be referred to the State Government, whose decision would be final.
Justice Bhattacharya made a conjoint reading of Section 24 of the Pharmacy Act and Rule 23 of the Rules made under the Pharmacy Act which stated that the power to decide any dispute arising regarding such election had been vested upon the State Government who shall exercise the jurisdiction vested upon it by the statute which conferred such jurisdiction. Section 24 used the expression “any dispute arises regarding any such election” which was a very wide connotation and necessarily implied that any dispute arising out of such election would be raised only before the authority vested with such power under the statute and in the manner and the time as prescribed under the relevant Rules. This Court had to thus, consider whether rejection of nomination could be said to be a dispute arising out of such election and the right to contest the election flowed from the said statute. Therefore, such right would have to be exercised strictly in accordance with the provisions of such statute and would be subject to the limitations imposed by it.
Justice Bhattacharya stated that sub rule (2) of Rule 5 entitled every nominee and one duly authorised representative or his proposer or seconder to be present at the time of scrutiny. The object behind insertion of such provision was to afford an opportunity to a nominee to raise an objection at the spot in case he was aggrieved by the decision of the Returning Officer. Though no time limit has been fixed for filing of objection under Rule 5(1) but the said rule used the expression ‘forthwith’.
Upon a harmonious reading of sub rules (1) and (2) of Rule 5, Justice Bhattacharya held that the objection against rejection of nomination was to be made immediately and without any delay i.e., it should be made at the spot or within a reasonable time immediately thereafter. Even if for some reason, the objection against nomination could not be made at the spot, the same had to be done within a reasonable time. Reasonable time, however, would depend on the facts of each case. In this regard it was to be borne in mind that the list of nominated candidates were to be published after the last date of withdrawal of nominations and several steps were to be undertaken thereafter in terms of the relevant rules more particularly Rule 8 thereof. Record revealed that in pursuance of Rule 8(1) of the Election Rules, the names of the nominated Registered Pharmacist was published on 27-12-2022 in the Kolkata Gazette. The authorities could not, however, be faulted for publication of the names of nominated candidates in terms of Rule 8(1).
“The objections were filed only after such publication for reasons best known to the writ petitioners. Considering the relevant dates for scrutiny of nomination; withdrawal of nomination and the publication of the names of nominated candidates, the objection filed on January 1, 2023 cannot be held to be within the reasonable time in the facts of the case on hand. Therefore, the objection filed on January 1, 2023 against the order of rejection is a highly belated one. For such reason, I hold that the objection dated January 1, 2023 cannot fall within the parameters of Rule 5(1).”
Justice Bhattacharya was of the view that the writ court should not have embarked upon an enquiry into the reasons for rejection of nomination papers as the objection did not fall within the parameters of Rule 5(1). It was not in dispute that 3 out of 4 respondents were present at the time of scrutiny. Therefore, it would be deemed that they were aware of the reasons for rejection of their nominations at the time of such scrutiny. The remaining writ petitioner, for reasons best known to him/her did not attend at the time of scrutiny. However, their request for disclosing the reasons for rejection was duly complied with. The respondents even after being made aware of the reasons for rejection did not avail of the remedies provided under the statute promptly and in the manner as provided therein. Therefore, no injustice can be said to have been done to the writ petitioner as alleged by them.
Justice Bhattacharya held that improper rejection of nomination, could not be assailed by filing an application under Article 226 of the Constitution and impugned judgement was not justified in allowing the objection against rejection of nomination while the election was in progress.
In view thereof, the impugned order was set aside and the Returning Officer was directed to conclude the election process and to publish the result within 4 weeks from the receipt of the order. The respondent nos. 1 to 4 as well as any other aggrieved person were left free to approach the competent authority as per the Pharmacy Act and the rules framed thereunder for referring the dispute in accordance with law. However, it was made clear that the Court had not entered into the merits of the objections raised against the order of rejection of nominations and the same were left open to be decided at the appropriate stage.
Read Order: JBT (Jai Bharath Travels) V. The Deputy Commissioner (ST)
Chahat Varma
New Delhi, May 26, 2023: The writ petition filed by Jai Bharath Travels (petitioner) has been allowed by the Andhra Pradesh High Court, and the order dated 15.12.2022, passed by the Deputy Commissioner (ST), Special Circle, Chittoor Division (1st respondent) under the State Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, for the tax periods 2017-18, 2018-19, and 2019-20 (up to November 2019) has been set aside. The petitioner has been granted liberty to submit the relevant records showing the turnover of their bus business separately for the states of Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Tamil Nadu, and Puducherry. The Authorities have been instructed to conduct a fresh assessment in accordance with law.
Brief facts of the case were that the petitioner was engaged in plying passenger buses in different States i.e., Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Tamil Nadu and Puducherry. They had challenged the impugned order dated 15.12.2022, which wrongly assessed them to tax for the total turnover in multiple states. The petitioner argued that as per the statute, they should only be assessed to tax for the turnover related to Andhra Pradesh, and the turnover in other states should be taxed as per the relevant statutes of those states.
The court found merit in the petitioner's claim and deemed it appropriate to grant them an opportunity to furnish separate turnover data for Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Telangana, and Puducherry.
Read Order: Nidhan Singh Kushwaha and Ors v. State of Chhattisgarh
Chahat Varma
New Delhi, May 26, 2023: The High Court of Chhattisgarh has granted anticipatory bail to Nidhan Singh Kuchwaha, former Assistant Director (Horticulture), Jignesh Patel, Proprietor of M/s. Kishan Agrotech and Mr. Satish Jindal, Proprietor of M/s. Jai Gurudev, in a case where they were accused of irregularity in not depositing GST in the accounts of the Central and State Governments.
In the present case, applications were filed under section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking anticipatory bail. The applicants were apprehending arrest for offenses under sections 409, 420, 120B, and 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
The prosecution had alleged that the applicants were involved in an irregular withdrawal of subsidy funds for the construction of Shed Net House/Green House and Pack House/Poly House. On enquiry, it was found that for a single farmer, only one net house was constructed and thereby, the applicants in a fraudulent manner, had committed irregularity by not depositing GST in the account(s) of the Central and State Governments.
The applicants argued that the applicants did not cause any financial loss to the government or its beneficiaries. They contended that the subsidy amount was given only for the construction of one shed, and this amount was directly deposited into the beneficiaries' accounts and thereafter, the beneficiaries placed the order to the concerned firms.
The bench noted that during the proceedings, on being asked, the learned counsel for the objector failed to demonstrate as to how much loss had been caused to the State from the amount released in the subsidy. The counsel also failed to submit any correspondent sent to the concerned GST Department for necessary recovery against the defaulter. The counsel for the State further mentioned that no information regarding the matter was available in the case diary, and the Departmental Enquiry Report did not include any such information gathered from the GST authorities.
Taking into consideration the submissions, nature of accusation and the quality of evidence, the court allowed the bail applications.
Read Order:Pandyan Hotels Limited v. The Secretary to Government And Ors
Tulip Kanth
Chennai, May 26, 2023: While observing that a high value property situated in heart of Madurai City cannot be assigned in favour of the peitioner-Hotel by compromising the public interest and causing financial loss, the Madras High Court has held that the State Govt’s decision of not assigning the land in favour of the petitioner is well founded and in consonance with the established principles of the Constitution.
Noting that the petitioner lost its credibility to claim any leniency from the hands of the High Court, Justice S.M.Subramaniam said, “ The petitioner committed series of defaults and is in unauthorised occupation of the Government property without even paying the rent. The lease expired in the year 2008. The market value of the land is above Rs.300 Crores. Thus, by granting largees, the Executives cannot cause financial loss to the State Coffers.”
The petition in question was filed by Pandyan Hotels Limited. Various orders were passed by the first respondent to lease the land situated in Madurai North Village for a period of 25 years on a monthly lease in favour of M/s.P.C.M. Sons. The Petitioner Hotel after reclaiming the land, put up construction by spending their own funds and the Hotel was commissioned.
The petitioner paid a sum of Rs 2 crore as advance and the value of the land was fixed at Rs 38,58,60,000 calculated at the rate of Rs.1,500 per sq.ft. The petitioner stated that despite the efforts taken by them to secure loans from the Bank, they could not do so and the private parties were not willing to part with their money.
The petitioner sought time to pay a sum of Rs 31,08,83,940 as the Indian Overseas Bank had expressed its inability to sanction the loan and after issuance of various notices, the petitioner submitted a reply, expressing their inability to pay the amount. Thereafter, an order was issued in 2015, under which, the Petitioner was called upon to pay a sum of Rs 36,58,60,000 immediately, failing which, steps were to be taken to cancel the order of assignment. The said notice was under challenge in the writ petition.
Firstly, the Bench enunciated the legal principles pertaining to the concept of public interest in the matter of public policy and concept of reasonableness. Reference was made to the judgment in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India , which clearly demonstrated that the requirement of reasonableness runs like a golden thread through the entire fabric of fundamental rights.
“The Constitution of India invokes the term “Public Interest” at nine places in its Article 22, 31A(b) and 31A(c) of Fundamental Rights of the Citizen, 263, 302, Entries 52, 54, 56 of the Union List and Entry 33 of the Concurrent List”, the Bench specifically noted and also observed that while exercising the powers of judicial review the Court can look into the reasons given by the Government in support of its action but cannot substitute its own reasons. The Court can strike down an executive order, if it finds the reasons assigned were irrelevant and extraneous, the Bench further clarified.
The Bench noticed that the petitioner was in unauthorised occupation of the Government land after the year 2008 and failed to pay the land cost as demanded by the Government. Pertinently, the petitioner had not even paid the rent. Perusal of the representations continuously submitted by the petitioner and the response made by the Government authorities indicated that the petitioner had no intention to settle the land cost as fixed by the Government.
Considering the fact that the Government of Tamil Nadu as per their announcement is facing financial crunch, the Bench opined that the Government is duty bound to revisit all such Government agreements/ Leases / Contracts in respect of Government lands, properties etc., across the state of Tamil Nadu and ensure that the public interest and the Revenue of the State has been protected.
The Bench directed the District Collectors across the State of Tamil Nadu to ensure that the Government contracts, leases, assignments etc., are published in the Government website along with the details including name of the village, lease amount or the rent fixed or otherwise, period of lease, purpose for which the Government property was leased out or assigned or otherwise, recovery of rent or arrears of rent as the case may be and also the name of the defaulters and the actions taken.
The High Court also ordered the respondents to resume the land by evicting the petitioner/Hotel. The respondents were also asked to calculate the rental arrears and other charges due to the Government and recover the same from the petitioner by following the procedures as contemplated and without causing any undue delay.
Read Order: PCPL and RK- JV v. The State of Bihar and Ors
Chahat Varma
New Delhi, May 26, 2023: The Patna High Court has disposed of the writ petition filed by PCPL and RK-JV (petitioners) against the State of Bihar and others (respondents), granting the petitioners the benefit of stay under sub-section (9) of section 112 of the Bihar Goods and Services Tax Act (B.G.S.T. Act), subject to the deposit of 20 percent of the remaining amount of tax in dispute.
In the present case, the petitioners were desirous of availing the statutory remedy of appeal against the impugned order before the Appellate Tribunal under section 112 of the B.G.S.T. Act. However, due to non-constitution of the Tribunal, the petitioners were deprived of this statutory remedy.
The High Court emphasized that the petitioners cannot be deprived of the benefit of stay on the recovery of balance amount of tax, due to non- constitution of the Appellate Tribunal by the respondents themselves.
Read Order: M/s R.K. Jewelers v. The Union of India and Ors
Chahat Varma
New Delhi, May 26, 2023: The Jodhpur bench of the High Court of Rajasthan has disposed of the writ petition filed by M/s R.K. Jewelers (petitioner-firm), considering the notification dated 31.03.2023 issued under the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The court has granted the petitioner-firm the liberty to file an application for the restoration of its GST registration before the competent authority.
The present writ petition was filed by the petitioner-firm, challenging the cancellation of its GST registration due to non-filing of GST return. The petitioner's appeal against the cancellation order was also rejected by the Appellate Authority.
The division bench of the High Court observed that while the writ petition was pending, the competent authority under the Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 had issued a notification on 31.03.2023, and as per the said notification, on the conditions being fulfilled, the cancellation of registration effected on the ground of non-filing of GST return, could be revoked.
The bench opined that the case of the petitioner firm was covered by the notification dated 31.03.2023 and the petitioner firm could submit an application to the competent authority, requesting the restoration of its GST registration, provided that it satisfied the conditions mentioned in the said notification.
Read Order: Sakshi Bahl & Anr V. The Principal Additional Director General
Chahat Varma
New Delhi, May 26, 2023: The Delhi High Court division bench comprising of Justice Vibhu Bakhru and Justice Amit Mahajan has ruled that the attachment of bank accounts is a draconian step and that can only be taken if the conditions specified in section 83 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (CGST Act), are fully met. The court emphasized that the exercise of power under section 83 must necessarily be confined within the limits of the aforesaid provision.
The petitioners in the case had challenged an order issued by the Principal Additional Director General, DGGI, DZU, which directed the provisional attachment of their savings bank accounts. The respondent had taken this action based on a statement made by Rajiv Chawla during an investigation into fake firms involved in fraudulent claims of Input Tax Credit. The respondent believed that the funds in the petitioners' bank accounts belonged to the partners of M/s Hindustan Paper Machinery Industry and, therefore, proceeded to attach their accounts.
The court held that the power under section 83 of the Act, to provisionally attach assets or bank accounts, was restricted to attaching the bank accounts and assets of taxable persons and persons specified under section 122(1A) of the Act, however, in this case, the court determined that the petitioners were not taxable persons or persons falling under section 122(1A) of the Act.
The court said that it was not open for the respondent to attach the bank accounts of other persons on a mere assumption that the funds therein were owned by any taxable person. Consequently, court concluded that the impugned order of attaching the bank accounts of the petitioners cannot be upheld.
Read Order: Murugaiyan And Ors v. State rep.by The Inspector of Police And Ors
Tulip Kanth
Chennai, May 26, 2023: While observing that the gang members belonging to the banned organisation-Tamil Nadu Liberation Force, who had attacked Andimadam police station and looted the arms, had no intention to cause death or harm to any person, the Madras High Court has partly allowed the criminal Appeals filed by the accused persons.
“From the evidence, this Court is able to arrive at conclusion that the accused persons had no intention to cause death or harm to any person. Their intention was to loot arms from the police station and to record their intention by pasting the posters and distributing the pamphlets”, Justice G.Jayachandran asserted.
This incident occurred in the year 1997 when an armed gang consisting of about 20 members entered into the Andimadam Police Station and barged into the Inspector room. On seeing them the Headconstable and Constable locked the door inside. One of the members of the gang latched the room out side to prevent the Head Constable and Constable from coming out of the Inspector room. The members of the gang threatened SI-Viswanathan with guns and knife.
The gang members collected the weapons kept in a box at the station. Viswanathan was attacked and after robbing the arms and ammunitions, the gang damaged the VHF equipments in the police station and also took away the police uniform of Viswanathan, which was kept in the suit case and they threw written pamphlets containing slogans eulogising their leader and their ideology of separate Tamil Desam.
Some of the posters were pasted on the compound wall of the police station. Irulappan, who regained self, opened the doors of Inspector room and writer room. The higher officials were informed about the incident and they all by mid-night came to the police station. In the course of investigation, 15 persons were arrested. Confession statements of those persons were recorded. The arms looted from the police station were substantially recovered from them.
Aggrieved by the conviction and sentence, Murugaiyan [A4] Sundaramoorthy [A5], Jeyachandran [A6], Sekar @ Chinnathambi [A7], Nagarajan [A9] & Ponnivalavan @ Murugan [A13] had filed Criminal Appeals. Natarajan [A4] died in the prison and his appeal was abated.
The Bench noted that based on the materials placed by the prosecution, the trial Court framed charges against the accused persons & these accused along with the approver Veeraiyan belonged to a banned organisation by name Tamilnadu Liberation Force. The object of the association is to liberate Tamilnadu from Union of India.
They all conspired to attack Andimadam police station on July 13, 1997 and to loot the arms and destroy other materials. For the said purpose, between January 1996 to July 1997, they met at various places and schemed the crime.
It was noticed that the approver had spoken about the accused persons, their participation in the conspiracy and overt act in the crime. “Though the approver testimony is a weak piece of evidence, when it lend credence to the evidence of other substantive witnesses namely the eye witnesses, his evidence is required for the identity of the persons who form part of the unlawful assembly armed with weapons”, the Bench added.
The Bench further observed, “ It is a high profile case, where the members of separatist organisation were involved in looting the arms in the police station. Despite notoriousity of the organisation, public witnesses have come forward to substantiate the case of the prosecution regarding arrest, recovery based on the confession of the accused persons. The Material Objects recovered from these accused has been identified by the witnesses of police department that they belong to the department and supplied to the Andimadam police station.”
Reference was made to the photographs of the ransacked police station which were the evidence to prove that the public property had been extensively damaged besides decoity committed by the armed gang. The said act was pursuant to conspiracy, the Bench stated while adding, “ In the case of conspiracy, the act of one person is the act of all the other co conspirators. The presence of the appellants at the scene of occurrence has been spoken by the witnesses present and the approver. The recovery of the looted arms from the accused persons in the presence of independent witnesses well established through the witnesses, who have signed the respective recovery Mahazar.”
The Bench found no error in the judgment of the trial Court and opined that A9 couldnot be punished for offence under Sections 4(b) and 5 of Explosives Substances Act, 1908. In this case, if that charge is excluded, the major offence committed by the appellants will be decoity, unlawful assembly armed with weapon preventing public servant from discharging the duty putting them under fear of death and wrongful confinement, the Bench further opined.
Thus, considering the gravity of offence as well as the period of incarceration suffered by the appellants pending trial and after trial, the Bench modified the period of sentence and partly allowed the appeal.
Read More: Bheru Lal v State of Rajasthan
Simran Singh
New Delhi, May 26, 2023: The Rajasthan High Court dismissed the bail application filed by the accused-petitioners, who were government employees, under Section 439 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and had been arrested in connection with the F.I.R. registered for the offences punishable under Sections 420, 409, 467, 468, 120-B of Indian Penal Code, 1860.
The Court prima facie found the accused-petitioners who were government employees were guilty of pilfering various food items received by them for distribution among the economically deprived and rural students of Tribal Sub Plan areas.
In the matter at hand, upon receiving a reliable information; in regards to changing of the packing of various food items, like milk powder etc., which was provided by the State of Rajasthan to Government Schools for free distribution amongst the students in pursuance of various Government Schemes, was being sold in the market; the police searched the house of the co-accused from where a huge quantity of various food items were recovered. During the investigation, neither a valid document nor a license to store the aforementioned items could be shown to the police. Moreover, it was discovered that the items were being procured and purchased from the Government School teachers, in exchange of money.
The accused-petitioners contended that they were falsely being implicated solely on the basis of statements of the co-accused and the offences alleged to have been committed by the accused-petitioners were triable by Court of Magistrate. It was further submitted that the none of the accused-petitioner had any criminal antecedents and the since they were in judicial custody and the trial of the case would take a sufficiently long time , therefore, benefit of bail was to be granted to them.
“The object of launching such welfare schemes by the Government is to encourage students belonging to economically backward or weaker sections of the society or low income families to join and regularly attend school, so that they can become educated enabling them to conquer various challenges faced by them, despite them being members of the lowest rung of the society.” added the Bench.
The Bench opined that the accused-petitioner being government employees were entrusted with the responsibility of popularising various Government Schemes aimed at promoting education among the students of Tribal Sub Plan areas. The accused-petitioners had not only failed to perform the responsibility casted on them for personal gains but had in effect undermined the very object sought to be achieved by these schemes. The accused-petitioner through their acts had cheated the public at large causing huge financial loss to the public exchequer.
In view thereof, the Court dismissed the bail applications, however, clarified that they would be at liberty to file fresh bail applications after filing of challan against them by investigating agency before competent criminal court. It was further made clear that the Court had not entered into the merits of the case and none of the observations would operate prejudicial to the interests of the parties nor would have any bearing on the final verdict by the Trial Court.
Read More: R.K. Mishra v Nidhi Pandey
Simran Singh
New Delhi, May 26, 2023: The Delhi High Court, in a Civil Contempt petition, dismissed the grievance pertaining to the fact that the respondent had not complied with the directions issued by the Division Bench (DB) of this Court vide judgment dated 11-10-2022, whereby the respondent was directed to consider and decide the petitioner’s representation for a ‘Request Transfer’ in accordance with Rule 16(h) of the Kendriya Vidyalaya Sanghathan Transfer Guidelines, 2021[1] (‘Transfer Guidelines, 2021’) within a period of 4 weeks.
The Court stated that the other applicants, who were seeking transfer to Kendriya Vidyalaya (‘KV’) at Jaipur and having been denied the said transfer despite having higher number of transfer count, failed to appreciate the wrong as alleged by the petitioner. Therefore, opined that the directions issued by the DB vide judgment dated 11-10-2022 had been complied with by the respondent.
In the matter at hand, the petitioner being a Trained Graduate Teacher (English) working under the Kendriya Vidyalaya Sanghathan (‘KVS’) at KV Pali had been seeking a transfer to one of the KVs at Jaipur vide application dated 14-10-2022 on ‘spouse ground’, however, since he did not receive any decision on the said representation within 4 weeks, which expired on 08-11-2022, he preferred the present contempt petition on 16-11-2022 aggrieved by the non-communication of the decision.
The respondent in its Memorandum dated 17-11-2022 while disposing of the petitioner’s application dated 14-10-2022, recorded that paragraph 16 (b) (iii) of the Transfer Guidelines, 2021 had been kept in abeyance vide notice dated 12-09-2022 and that the Annual Transfer Process of KVS had been suspended for the academic year 2022-23 and only administrative transfers were being affected for the purpose of re-distribution and rationalisation of the teaching staff. It was stated that currently it was not feasible to transfer the petitioner to any of the KVs at Jaipur on ‘spouse ground’.
This Court vide order dated 02-12-2022, after perusing the Memorandum dated 17-11-2022 opined that it was a non-speaking order and directed the respondent to pass a reasoned order on petitioner’s representation dated 14-10-2022. The respondent in deference to this Court’s order dated 02-12-2022 issued a Memorandum dated 09-12-2022, wherein reference was made to a subsequent judgment dated 04-11-2022 passed by the DB of this Court, wherein it had taken note of the Notice dated 12-09-2022, issued by KVS suspending the Annual Transfer Process for the academic session of 2022-23. The respondent relied upon the said judgment to state that the DB had duly taken note of the suspension of the Transfer Guidelines 2021 and therefore, reiterated that petitioner’s request for transfer on the ‘spouse ground’ was presently suspended and could not be considered. Pertinently, in the judgment dated 04-11-2022, the DB had granted liberty to the petitioner to apply for a transfer as per paragraph 9 of the Transfer Guidelines, 2021 which he did not elect for.
The petitioner subsequently filed a civil miscellaneous application contending that there were vacancies in KV No. 1, Jaipur and KV No. 2, Jaipur, wherein the petitioner could be accommodated and it was averred that the rejection of the petitioner’s application dated 14-10-2022 was in contravention of the direction issued by the DB vide order dated 11-10-2022. The Respondent filed its reply to the said application explaining the circumstances in which the Annual Transfer Process had been suspended and the rationale behind it. The respondent had taken a stand that the petitioner was not eligible for transfer to KVs, at Jaipur at this stage. The respondent had also placed on record written instructions dated 07-03-2023 to contend that two other applicants who had applied for transfer to KVs in Jaipur and even though the said applicants had more transfer counts than the petitioner herein, their applications were not accepted either.
The Bench opined that the direction issued by the DB vide judgment dated 11-10-2022 had been complied with, upon perusing the Memorandum dated 17-11-2022 and 09-12-2022 issued but he respondent explaining the circumstances in which the request for transfer on ‘spouse ground’ could not be considered by them. The respondent had also placed reliance on the Notice dated 12-09-2022 suspending the Annual Transfer Process for the academic year 2022-23 and its consideration by the DB in the subsequent judgment dated 04-11-2022.
The Court while referring to the Supreme Court judgment of J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar stated that the the directions issued by the DB was limited to directing the respondent to ‘consider’ the said application and the said direction had been complied with. The contents of the written instructions dated 07-03-2023 filed by the respondent had not been disputed by the petitioner and in fact the contents thereof were borne out by the copies of the RTI reply handed over to the Court by the petitioner during the proceedings.
The Bench referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Ram Kishan v. Tarun Bajaj, wherein it was observed that the Court had to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that a contempt had been committed by the respondent. In view thereof, the Court stated that there had been no violation or disobedience of the judgment dated 11-10-2022. Accordingly, the present petition alleging contempt could not be maintained, thus, dismissed.
Read Order: DCIT(E), Circle 1(1) v. Institute of Marketing & Management
Chahat Varma
New Delhi, May 25, 2023: The Delhi bench of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal has ruled that in the case of a charitable institution, when the income is utilized for charitable purposes, including the purchase of fixed assets, it should be treated as a deduction of income and hence, the income, to the extent utilized for charitable purposes, is considered as applied for such purposes and is not taxable under section 11(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act.
Brief facts of the case were that the Assessing Officer (AO) disallowed the depreciation claimed by the assessee. The AO argued that the CIT(A) erred in allowing the assessee the benefit of exemption despite the violation of provisions under section 13(1)(c) read with section 13(3) of the Income Tax Act. The AO contended that the assessee failed to provide documentary evidence to substantiate that the use of vehicles was for charitable purposes. Additionally, the AO claimed that the depreciation in question pertained to assets purchased in earlier years, and the entire cost of those assets had already been allowed as an application of income in the year of purchase. On the other hand, the assessee argued that the issue of allowing depreciation was already addressed in the Tribunal's order dated 21.02.2014 for Assessment Year 2009-10, where it was held that depreciation is a normal expenditure incurred in the course of activities and should be deducted while computing the income. The assessee also mentioned that similar issues had been decided in their favor for the preceding assessment and the assessee contended that the CIT(A) was correct in following the same order and deleting the disallowance made by the AO regarding the alleged personal use of vehicles.
Top of Form
The two-member bench of Chandra Mohan Garg (Judicial) and Pradip Kumar Kedia observed that the issue regarding the deduction of depreciation while computing the income as application of income for a charitable trust had already been decided by the Co-ordinate bench of the Tribunal in the assessee's own case in a previous order, wherein, the Tribunal, relying on the judgment of the High Court of Delhi in the case of DIT vs. Vishwa Jagriti Mission [LQ/DelHC/2012/1775], has held that depreciation was inextricably linked with the charitable activities of the trust and should be allowed as a deduction.
The bench noted that the revenue department failed to present any contrary judgment or factual position that would justify a different view. As a result, the bench concluded that there was no ambiguity or perversity in the first appellate order, wherein the appellate authority had allowed the claim of depreciation for assets purchased in the earlier years as application of income.
The bench further held that the assessee was eligible for the allowance of depreciation claimed on the cost of assets purchased during the preceding assessment years as an application of income for the assessment year 2014-15. The bench based its decision on the fact that the amendment made in section 11(6) of the Income Tax Act, was applicable from the assessment year 2015-16 onwards and did not have a retrospective effect for the immediately preceding assessment year 2014-15. The bench relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Rajasthan and Gujarati Foundation [LQ/SC/2017/1836] in support of its decision.
Dismissing the appeal of the revenue, it was concluded by the bench that the CIT (A) was correct in holding that the assessee was eligible for claiming depreciation as an application of income on the assets purchased during the preceding assessment year and consequently, the assessee was also eligible for the benefit of exemption under section 11 of the Income Tax Act.
Time for judiciary to introspect and see what can be done to restore people’s faith – Justice Lokur
Justice Madan B Lokur, was a Supreme Court judge from June 2012 to December 2018. He is now a judge of the non-resident panel of the Supreme Court of Fiji. He spoke to LegitQuest on January 25, 2020.
Q: You were a Supreme Court judge for more than 6 years. Do SC judges have their own ups and downs, in the sense that do you have any frustrations about cases, things not working out, the kind of issues that come to you?
A: There are no ups and downs in that sense but sometimes you do get a little upset at the pace of justice delivery. I felt that there were occasions when justice could have been delivered much faster, a case could have been decided much faster than it actually was. (When there is) resistance in that regard normally from the state, from the establishment, then you kind of feel what’s happening, what can I do about it.
Q: So you have had the feeling that the establishment is trying to interfere in the matters?
A: No, not interfering in matters but not giving the necessary importance to some cases. So if something has to be done in four weeks, for example if reply has to be filed within four weeks and they don’t file it in four weeks just because they feel that it doesn’t matter, and it’s ok if we file it within six weeks how does it make a difference. But it does make a difference.
Q: Do you think this attitude is merely a lax attitude or is it an infrastructure related problem?
A: I don’t know. Sometimes on some issues the government or the establishment takes it easy. They don’t realise the urgency. So that’s one. Sometimes there are systemic issues, for example, you may have a case that takes much longer than anticipated and therefore you can’t take up some other case. Then that necessarily has to be adjourned. So these things have to be planned very carefully.
Q: Are there any cases that you have special memories of in terms of your personal experiences while dealing with the case? It might have moved you or it may have made you feel that this case is really important though it may not be considered important by the government or may have escaped the media glare?
A: All the cases that I did with regard to social justice, cases which concern social justice and which concern the environment, I think all of them were important. They gave me some satisfaction, some frustration also, in the sense of time, but I would certainly remember all these cases.
Q: Even though you were at the Supreme Court as a jurist, were there any learning experiences for you that may have surprised you?
A: There were learning experiences, yes. And plenty of them. Every case is a learning experience because you tend to look at the same case with two different perspectives. So every case is a great learning experience. You know how society functions, how the state functions, what is going on in the minds of the people, what is it that has prompted them to come the court. There is a great learning, not only in terms of people and institutions but also in terms of law.
Q: You are a Judge of the Supreme Court of Fiji, though a Non-Resident Judge. How different is it in comparison to being a Judge in India?
A: There are some procedural distinctions. For example, there is a great reliance in Fiji on written submissions and for the oral submissions they give 45 minutes to a side. So the case is over within 1 1/2 hours maximum. That’s not the situation here in India. The number of cases in Fiji are very few. Yes, it’s a small country, with a small number of cases. Cases are very few so it’s only when they have an adequate number of cases that they will have a session and as far as I am aware they do not have more than two or three sessions in a year and the session lasts for maybe about three weeks. So it’s not that the court sits every day or that I have to shift to Fiji. When it is necessary and there are a good number of cases then they will have a session, unlike here. It is then that I am required to go to Fiji for three weeks. The other difference is that in every case that comes to the (Fiji) Supreme Court, even if special leave is not granted, you have to give a detailed judgement which is not the practice here.
Q: There is a lot of backlog in the lower courts in India which creates a problem for the justice delivery system. One reason is definitely shortage of judges. What are the other reasons as to why there is so much backlog of cases in the trial courts?
A: I think case management is absolutely necessary and unless we introduce case management and alternative methods of dispute resolution, we will not be able to solve the problem. I will give you a very recent example about the Muzaffarpur children’s home case (in Bihar) where about 34 girls were systematically raped. There were about 17 or 18 accused persons but the entire trial finished within six months. Now that was only because of the management and the efforts of the trial judge and I think that needs to be studied how he could do it. If he could do such a complex case with so many eyewitnesses and so many accused persons in a short frame of time, I don’t see why other cases cannot be decided within a specified time frame. That’s case management. The second thing is so far as other methods of disposal of cases are concerned, we have had a very good experience in trial courts in Delhi where more than one lakh cases have been disposed of through mediation. So, mediation must be encouraged at the trial level because if you can dispose so many cases you can reduce the workload. For criminal cases, you have Plea Bargaining that has been introduced in 2009 but not put into practice. We did make an attempt in the Tis Hazari Courts. It worked to some extent but after that it fell into disuse. So, plea bargaining can take care of a lot of cases. And there will be certain categories of cases which we need to look at carefully. For example, you have cases of compoundable offences, you have cases where fine is the punishment and not necessarily imprisonment, or maybe it’s imprisonment say one month or two month’s imprisonment. Do we need to actually go through a regular trial for these kind of cases? Can they not be resolved or adjudicated through Plea Bargaining? This will help the system, it will help in Prison Reforms, (prevent) overcrowding in prisons. So there are a lot of avenues available for reducing the backlog. But I think an effort has to be made to resolve all that.
Q: Do you think there are any systemic flaws in the country’s justice system, or the way trial courts work?
A: I don’t think there are any major systemic flaws. It’s just that case management has not been given importance. If case management is given importance, then whatever systematic flaws are existing, they will certainly come down.
Q; And what about technology. Do you think technology can play a role in improving the functioning of the justice delivery system?
I think technology is very important. You are aware of the e-courts project. Now I have been told by many judges and many judicial academies that the e-courts project has brought about sort of a revolution in the trial courts. There is a lot of information that is available for the litigants, judges, lawyers and researchers and if it is put to optimum use or even semi optimum use, it can make a huge difference. Today there are many judges who are using technology and particularly the benefits of the e-courts project is an adjunct to their work. Some studies on how technology can be used or the e-courts project can be used to improve the system will make a huge difference.
Q: What kind of technology would you recommend that courts should have?
A: The work that was assigned to the e-committee I think has been taken care of, if not fully, then largely to the maximum possible extent. Now having done the work you have to try and take advantage of the work that’s been done, find out all the flaws and see how you can rectify it or remove those flaws. For example, we came across a case where 94 adjournments were given in a criminal case. Now why were 94 adjournments given? Somebody needs to study that, so that information is available. And unless you process that information, things will just continue, you will just be collecting information. So as far as I am concerned, the task of collecting information is over. We now need to improve information collection and process available information and that is something I think should be done.
Q: There is a debate going on about the rights of death row convicts. CJI Justice Bobde recently objected to death row convicts filing lot of petitions, making use of every legal remedy available to them. He said the rights of the victim should be given more importance over the rights of the accused. But a lot of legal experts have said that these remedies are available to correct the anomalies, if any, in the justice delivery. Even the Centre has urged the court to adopt a more victim-centric approach. What is your opinion on that?
You see so far as procedures are concerned, when a person knows that s/he is going to die in a few days or a few months, s/he will do everything possible to live. Now you can’t tell a person who has got terminal cancer that there is no point in undergoing chemotherapy because you are going to die anyway. A person is going to fight for her/his life to the maximum extent. So if a person is on death row s/he will do everything possible to survive. You have very exceptional people like Bhagat Singh who are ready to face (the gallows) but that’s why they are exceptional. So an ordinary person will do everything possible (to survive). So if the law permits them to do all this, they will do it.
Q: Do you think law should permit this to death row convicts?
A: That is for the Parliament to decide. The law is there, the Constitution is there. Now if the Parliament chooses not to enact a law which takes into consideration the rights of the victims and the people who are on death row, what can anyone do? You can’t tell a person on death row that listen, if you don’t file a review petition within one week, I will hang you. If you do not file a curative petition within three days, then I will hang you. You also have to look at the frame of mind of a person facing death. Victims certainly, but also the convict.
Q: From the point of jurisprudence, do you think death row convicts’ rights are essential? Or can their rights be done away with?
A: I don’t know you can take away the right of a person fighting for his life but you have to strike a balance somewhere. To say that you must file a review or curative or mercy petition in one week, it’s very difficult. You tell somebody else who is not on a death row that you can file a review petition within 30 days but a person who is on death row you tell him that I will give you only one week, it doesn’t make any sense to me. In fact it should probably be the other way round.
Q: What about capital punishment as a means of punishment itself?
A: There has been a lot of debate and discussion about capital punishment but I think that world over it has now been accepted, more or less, that death penalty has not served the purpose for which it was intended. So, there are very few countries that are executing people. The United States, Saudi Arabia, China, Pakistan also, but it hasn’t brought down the crime rate. And India has been very conservative in imposing the death penalty. I think the last 3-4 executions have happened for the persons who were terrorists. And apart from that there was one from Calcutta who was hanged for rape and murder. But the fact that he was hanged for rape and murder has not deterred people (from committing rape and murder). So the accepted view is that death penalty has not served the purpose. We certainly need to rethink the continuance of capital punishment. On the other hand, if capital punishment is abolished, there might be fake encounter killings or extra judicial killings.
Q: These days there is the psyche among people of ‘instant justice’, like we saw in the case of the Hyderabad vet who was raped and murdered. The four accused in the case were killed in an encounter and the public at large and even politicians hailed it as justice being delivery. Do you think this ‘lynch mob mentality’ reflects people’s lack of faith in the justice system?
A: I think in this particular case about what happened in Telangana, investigation was still going on. About what actually happened there, an enquiry is going on. So no definite conclusions have come out. According to the police these people tried to snatch weapons so they had to be shot. Now it is very difficult to believe, as far as I am concerned, that 10 armed policeman could not overpower four unarmed accused persons. This is very difficult to believe. And assuming one of them happened to have snatched a (cop’s) weapon, maybe he could have been incapacitated but why the other three? So there are a lot of questions that are unanswered. So far as the celebrations are concerned, the people who are celebrating, do they know for certain that they (those killed in the encounter) were the ones who did the crime? How can they be so sure about it? They were not eye witnesses. Even witnesses sometimes make mistakes. This is really not a cause for celebration. Certainly not.
Q: It seems some people are losing their faith in the country’s justice delivery system. How to repose people’s faith in the legal process?
A: You see we again come back to case management and speedy justice. Suppose the Nirbhaya case would have been decided within two or three years, would this (Telangana) incident have happened? One can’t say. The attack on Parliament case was decided in two or three years but that has not wiped out terrorism. There are a lot of factors that go into all this, so there is a need to find ways of improving justice delivery so that you don’t have any extremes – where a case takes 10 years or another extreme where there is instant justice. There has to be something in between, some balance has to be drawn. Now you have that case where Phoolan Devi was gangraped followed by the Behmai massacre. Now this is a case of 1981, it has been 40 years and the trial court has still not delivered a judgement. It’s due any day now, (but) whose fault is that. You have another case in Maharashtra that has been transferred to National Investigating Agency two years after the incident, the Bhima-Koregaon case. Investigation is supposedly not complete after two years also. Whose fault is that? So you have to look at the entire system in a holistic manner. There are many players – the investigation agency is one player, the prosecution is one player, the defence is one player, the justice delivery system is one player. So unless all of them are in a position to coordinate… you cannot blame only the justice delivery system. If the Telangana police was so sure that the persons they have caught are guilty, why did they not file the charge sheet immediately? If they were so sure the charge sheet should have been filed within one day. Why didn’t they do it?
Q: At the trial level, there are many instances of flaws in evidence collection. Do you think the police or whoever the investigators are, do they lack training?
A: Yes they do! The police lacks training. I think there is a recent report that has come out last week which says very few people (in the police) have been trained (to collect evidence).
Q: You think giving proper training to police to prepare a case will make a difference?
A: Yes, it will make a difference.
Q: You have a keen interest in juvenile justice. Unfortunately, a lot of heinous crimes are committed by juveniles. How can we correct that?
A: You see it depends upon what perspective we are looking at. Now these heinous crimes are committed by juveniles. Heinous crimes are committed by adults also, so why pick upon juveniles alone and say something should be done because juveniles are committing heinous crimes. Why is it that people are not saying that something should be done when adults are committing heinous crimes? That’s one perspective. There are a lot of heinous crimes that are committed against juveniles. The number of crimes committed against juveniles or children are much more than the crimes committed by juveniles. How come nobody is talking about that? And the people committing heinous crimes against children are adults. So is it okay to say that the State has imposed death penalty for an offence against the child? So that’s good enough, nothing more needs to be done? I don’t think that’s a valid answer. The establishment must keep in mind the fact that the number of heinous crimes against children are much more than those committed by juveniles. We must shift focus.
Q: Coming to NRC and CAA. Protests have been happening since December last year, the SC is waiting for the Centre’s reply, the Delhi HC has refused to directly intervene. Neither the protesters nor the government is budging. How do we achieve a breakthrough?
A: It is for the government to decide what they want to do. If the government says it is not going to budge, and the people say they are not going to budge, the stalemate could continue forever.
Q: Do you think the CAA and the NRC will have an impact on civil liberties, personal liberties and people’s rights?
A: Yes, and that is one of the reasons why there is protest all over the country. And people have realised that it is going to happen, it is going to have an impact on their lives, on their rights and that’s why they are protesting. So the answer to your question is yes.
Q: Across the world and in India, we are seeing an erosion of the value system upholding rights and liberties. How important is it for the healthy functioning of a country that social justice, people’s liberties, people’s rights are maintained?
A: I think social justice issues, fundamental rights are of prime importance in our country, in any democracy, and the preamble to our Constitution makes it absolutely clear and the judgement of the Supreme Court in Kesavananda Bharati and many other subsequent judgments also make it clear that you cannot change the basic structure of the Constitution. If you cannot do that then obviously you cannot take away some basic democratic rights like freedom of assembly, freedom of movement, you cannot take them away. So if you have to live in a democracy, we have to accept the fact that these rights cannot be taken away. Otherwise there are many countries where there is no democracy. I don’t know whether those people are happy or not happy.
Q: What will happen if in a democracy these rights are controlled by hook or by crook?
A: It depends upon how much they are controlled. If the control is excessive then that is wrong. The Constitution says there must be a reasonable restriction. So reasonable restriction by law is very important.
Q: The way in which the sexual harassment case against Justice Gogoi was handled was pretty controversial. The woman has now been reinstated in the Supreme Court as a staffer. Does this action of the Supreme Court sort of vindicate her?
A: I find this very confusing you know. There is an old joke among lawyers: Lawyer for the petitioner argued before the judge and the judge said you are right; then the lawyer for the respondent argued before the judge and the judge said you’re right; then a third person sitting over there says how can both of them be right and the judge says you’re also right. So this is what has happened in this case. It was found (by the SC committee) that what she said had no substance. And therefore, she was wrong and the accused was right. Now she has been reinstated with back wages and all. I don’t know, I find it very confusing.
Q: Do you think the retirement age of Supreme Court Judges should be raised to 70 years and there should be a fixed tenure?
A: I haven’t thought about it as yet. There are some advantages, there are some disadvantages. (When) You have extended age or life tenure as in the United States, and the Supreme Court has a particular point of view, it will continue for a long time. So in the United States you have liberal judges and conservative judges, so if the number of conservative judges is high then the court will always be conservative. If the number of liberal judges is high, the court will always be liberal. There is this disadvantage but there is also an advantage that if it’s a liberal court and if it is a liberal democracy then it will work for the benefit of the people. But I have not given any serious thought onthis.
Q: Is there any other thing you would like to say?
A: I think the time has come for the judiciary to sit down, introspect and see what can be done, because people have faith in the judiciary. A lot of that faith has been eroded in the last couple of years. So one has to restore that faith and then increase that faith. I think the judiciary definitely needs to introspect.
‘A major issue for startups, especially during fund raising, is their compliance with extant RBI foreign exchange regulations, pricing guidelines, and the Companies Act 2013.’- Aakash Parihar
Aakash Parihar is Partner at Triumvir Law, a firm specializing in M&A, PE/VC, startup advisory, international commercial arbitration, and corporate disputes. He is an alumnus of the National Law School of India University, Bangalore.
How did you come across law as a career? Tell us about what made you decide law as an option.
Growing up in a small town in Madhya Pradesh, wedid not have many options.There you either study to become a doctor or an engineer. As the sheep follows the herd, I too jumped into 11th grade with PCM (Physics, Chemistry and Mathematics).However, shortly after, I came across the Common Law Admission Test (CLAT) and the prospect of law as a career. Being a law aspirant without any background of legal field, I hardly knew anything about the legal profession leave alone the niche areas of corporate lawor dispute resolution. Thereafter, I interacted with students from various law schools in India to understand law as a career and I opted to sit for CLAT. Fortunately, my hard work paid off and I made it to the hallowed National Law School of India University, Bangalore (NSLIU). Joining NLSIU and moving to Bangalorewas an overwhelming experience. However, after a few months, I settled in and became accustomed to the rigorous academic curriculum. Needless to mention that it was an absolute pleasure to study with and from someof the brightest minds in legal academia. NLSIU, Bangalore broadened my perspective about law and provided me with a new set of lenses to comprehend the world around me. Through this newly acquired perspective and a great amount of hard work (which is of course irreplaceable), I was able to procure a job in my fourth year at law school and thus began my journey.
As a lawyer carving a niche for himself, tell us about your professional journey so far. What are the challenges that new lawyers face while starting out in the legal field?
I started my professional journey as an Associate at Samvad Partners, Bangalore, where I primarily worked in the corporate team. Prior to Samvad Partners, through my internship, I had developed an interest towards corporate law,especially the PE/VC and M&A practice area. In the initial years as an associate at Samvad Partners and later at AZB & Partners, Mumbai, I had the opportunity to work on various aspects of corporate law, i.e., from PE/VC and M&A with respect to listed as well as unlisted companies. My work experience at these firms equipped and provided me the know-how to deal with cutting edge transactional lawyering. At this point, it is important to mention that I always had aspirations to join and develop a boutique firm. While I was working at AZB, sometime around March 2019, I got a call from Anubhab, Founder of Triumvir Law, who told me about the great work Triumvir Law was doing in the start-up and emerging companies’ ecosystem in Bangalore. The ambition of the firm aligned with mine,so I took a leap of faith to move to Bangalore to join Triumvir Law.
Anyone who is a first-generation lawyer in the legal industry will agree with my statement that it is never easy to build a firm, that too so early in your career. However, that is precisely the notion that Triumvir Law wanted to disrupt. To provide quality corporate and dispute resolution advisory to clients across India and abroad at an affordable price point.
Once you start your professional journey, you need to apply everything that you learnt in law schoolwith a practical perspective. Therefore, in my opinion, in addition to learning the practical aspects of law, a young lawyer needs to be accustomed with various practices of law before choosing one specific field to practice.
India has been doing reallywell in the field of M&A and PE/VC. Since you specialize in M&A and PE/VC dealmaking, what according to you has been working well for the country in this sphere? What does the future look like?
India is a developing economy, andM&A and PE/VC transactions form the backbone of the same. Since liberalization, there has been an influx of foreign investment in India, and we have seen an exponential rise in PC/VA and M&A deals. Indian investment market growth especially M&A and PE/VC aspects can be attributed to the advent of startup culture in India. The increase in M&A and PE/VC deals require corporate lawyersto handle the legal aspects of these deals.
As a corporate lawyer working in M&A and PE/VC space, my work ranges from drafting term-sheets to the transaction documents (SPA, SSA, SHA, BTA, etc.). TheM&A and PE/VC deal space experienced a slump during the first few months of the pandemic, but since June 2021, there has been a significant growth in M&A and PE/VC deal space in India. The growth and consistence of the M&A and PE/VC deal space in India can be attributed to several factors such as foreign investment, uncapped demands in the Indian market and exceptional performance of Indian startups.
During the pandemic many businesses were shut down but surprisingly many new businesses started, which adapted to the challenges imposed by the pandemic. Since we are in the recovery mode, I think the M&A and PE/VC deal space will reach bigger heights in the comingyears. We as a firm look forward to being part of this recovery mode by being part of the more M&A and PE/VC deals in future.
You also advice start-ups. What are the legal issues or challenges that the start-ups usually face specifically in India? Do these issues/challenges have long-term consequences?
We do a considerable amount of work with startupswhich range from day-to-day legal advisory to transaction documentation during a funding round. In India, we have noticed that a sizeable amount of clientele approach counsels only when there is a default or breach, more often than not in a state of panic. The same principle applies to startups in India, they normally approach us at a stage when they are about to receive investment or are undergoing due diligence. At that point of time, we need to understand their legal issues as well as manage the demands of the investor’s legal team. The majornon-compliances by startups usually involve not maintaining proper agreements, delaying regulatory filings and secretarial compliances, and not focusing on proper corporate governance.
Another major issue for startups, especially during fund raising, is their compliance with extant RBI foreign exchange regulations, pricing guidelines, and the Companies Act 2013. Keeping up with these requirements can be time-consuming for even seasoned lawyers, and we can only imagine how difficult it would be for startups. Startups spend their initial years focusing on fund-raising, marketing, minimum viable products, and scaling their businesses. Legal advice does not usually factor in as a necessity. Our firm aims to help startups even before they get off the ground, and through their initial years of growth. We wanted to be the ones bringing in that change in the legal sector, and we hope to help many more such startups in the future.
In your opinion, are there any specific India-related problems that corporate/ commercial firms face as far as the company laws are concerned? Is there scope for improvement on this front?
The Indian legal system which corporate/commercial firms deal with is a living breathing organism, evolving each year. Due to this evolving nature, we lawyers are always on our toes.From a minor amendment to the Companies Act to the overhaul of the foreign exchange regime by the Reserve Bank of India, each of these changes affect the compliance and regulatory regime of corporates. For instance, when India changed the investment route for countries sharing land border with India,whereby any country sharing land border with India including Hong Kong cannot invest in India without approval of the RBI in consultation with the central government,it impacted a lot of ongoing transactions and we as lawyers had to be the first ones to inform our clients about such a change in the country’s foreign investment policy. In my opinion, there is huge scope of improvement in legal regime in India, I think a stable regulatory and tax regime is the need for the hour so far as the Indian system is concerned. The biggest example of such a market with stable regulatory and tax regime is Singapore, and we must work towards emulating the same.
Your boutique law firm has offices in three different cities — Delhi NCR, Mumbai and Bangalore. Have the Covid-induced restrictions such as WFH affected your firm’s operations? How has your firm adapted to the professional challenges imposed by the pandemic-related lifestyle changes?
We have offices in New Delhi NCR and Mumbai, and our main office is in Bangalore. Before the pandemic, our work schedule involved a fair bit of travelling across these cities. But post the lockdowns we shifted to a hybrid model, and unless absolutely necessary, we usually work from home.
In relation to the professional challenges during the pandemic, I think it was a difficult time for most young professionals. We do acknowledge the fact that our firm survived the pandemic. Our work as lawyers/ law firms also involves client outreach and getting new clients, which was difficult during the lockdowns. We expanded our client outreach through digital means and by conducting webinars, including one with King’s College London on International Treaty Arbitration. Further, we also focused on client outreach and knowledge management during the pandemic to educate and create legal awareness among our clients.
‘It’s a myth that good legal advice comes at prohibitive costs. A lot of heartburn can be avoided if documents are entered into with proper legal advice and with due negotiations.’ – Archana Balasubramanian
Archana Balasubramanian is the founding partner of Agama Law Associates, a Mumbai-based corporate law firm which she started in 2014. She specialises in general corporate commercial transaction and advisory as well as deep sectoral expertise across manufacturing, logistics, media, pharmaceuticals, financial services, shipping, real estate, technology, engineering, infrastructure and health.
August 13, 2021:
Lawyers see companies ill-prepared for conflict, often, in India. When large corporates take a remedial instead of mitigative approach to legal issues – an approach utterly incoherent to both their size and the compliance ecosystem in their sector – it is there where the concept of costs on legal becomes problematic. Pre-dispute management strategy is much more rationalized on the business’ pocket than the costs of going in the red on conflict and compliances.
Corporates often focus on business and let go of backend maintenance of paperwork, raising issues as and when they arise and resolving conflicts / client queries in a manner that will promote dispute avoidance.
Corporate risk and compliance management is yet another elephant in India, which in addition to commercial disputes can be a drain on a company’s resources. It can be clubbed under four major heads – labour, industrial, financial and corporate laws. There are around 20 Central Acts and then specific state-laws by which corporates are governed under these four categories.
Risk and compliance management is also significantly dependent on the sector, size, scale and nature of the business and the activities being carried out.
The woes of a large number of promoters from the ecommerce ecosystem are to do with streamlining systems to navigate legal. India has certain heavily regulated sectors and, like I mentioned earlier, an intricate web of corporate risk and compliance legislation that can result in prohibitive costs in the remedial phase. To tackle the web in the preventive or mitigative phase, start-ups end up lacking the arsenal due to sheer intimidation from legal. Promoters face sectoral risks in sectors which are heavily regulated, risks of heavy penalties and fines under company law or foreign exchange laws, if fund raise is not done in a compliant manner.
It is a myth that good legal advice comes at prohibitive costs. Promoters are quick to sign on the dotted line and approach lawyers with a tick the box approach. A lot of heartburn can be avoided if documents are entered into with proper legal advice and with due negotiations.
Investment contracts, large celebrity endorsement contracts and CXO contracts are some key areas where legal advice should be obtained. Online contracts is also emerging as an important area of concern.
When we talk of scope, arbitration is pretty much a default mechanism at this stage for adjudicating commercial disputes in India, especially given the fixation of timelines for closure of arbitration proceedings in India. The autonomy it allows the parties in dispute to pick a neutral and flexible forum for resolution is substantial. Lower courts being what they are in India, arbitration emerges as the only viable mode of dispute resolution in the Indian commercial context.
The arbitrability of disputes has evolved significantly in the last 10 years. The courts are essentially pro-arbitration when it comes to judging the arbitrability of subject matter and sending matters to arbitration quickly.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in the Vidya Drolia case has significantly clarified the position in respect of tenancy disputes, frauds and consumer disputes. It reflects upon the progressive approach of the court and aims to enable an efficient, autonomous and effective arbitration environment in India.
Law firms stand for ensuring that the law works for business and not against it. Whatever the scope of our mandate, the bottom line is to ensure a risk-free, conflict-free, compliant and prepared enterprise for our client, in a manner that does not intimidate the client or bog them down, regardless of the intricacy of the legal and regulatory web it takes to navigate to get to that end result. Lawyers need to dissect the business of law from the work.
This really involves meticulous, detail-oriented, sheer hard work on the facts, figures, dates and all other countless coordinates of each mandate, repetitively and even to a, so-called, “dull” routine rhythm – with consistent single-mindedness and unflinching resolve.
As a firm, multiply that effort into volumes, most of it against-the-clock given the compliance heavy ecosystem often riddled with uncertainties in a number of jurisdictions. So the same meticulous streamlining of mandate deliverables has to be extrapolated by the management of the firm to the junior most staff.
Further, the process of streamlining itself has to be more dynamic than ever now given the pace at which the new economy, tech-ecosystem, business climate as well as business development processes turn a new leaf.
Finally, but above all, we need to find a way to feel happy, positive and energized together as a team while chasing all of the aforesaid dreams. The competitive timelines and volumes at which a law firm works, this too is a real challenge. But we are happy to face it and evolve as we grow.
We always as a firm operated on the work from anywhere principle. We believed in it and inculcated this through document management processes to the last trainee. This helped us shut shop one day and continue from wherever we are operating.
The team has been regularly meeting online (at least once a day). We have been able to channel the time spent in travelling to and attending meetings in developing our internal knowledge banks further, streamline our processes, and work on integrating various tech to make the practice more cost-effective for our clients.
Right to Disclosure – Importance & Challenges in Criminal Justice System – By Manu Sharma
Personal liberty is the most cherished value of human life which thrives on the anvil of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India (“the Constitution”). Once a person is named an accused, he faces the spectre of deprivation of his personal liberty and criminal trial. This threat is balanced by Constitutional safeguards which mandate adherence to the rule of law by the investigating agencies as well as the Court. Thus, any procedure which seeks to impinge on personal liberty must also be fair and reasonable. The right to life and personal liberty enshrined under article 21 of the Constitution, expanded in scope post Maneka Gandhi[1], yields the right to a fair trial and fair investigation. Fairness demands disclosure of anything relevant that may be of benefit to an accused. Further, the all-pervading principles of natural justice envisage the right to a fair hearing, which entails the right to a full defence. The right to a fair defence stems from full disclosure. Therefore, the right of an accused to disclosure emanates from this Constitutional philosophy embellished by the principles of natural justice and is codified under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“Code”).
Under English jurisprudence, the duty of disclosure is delineated in the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, which provides that the prosecutor must disclose to the accused any prosecution material which has not previously been disclosed to the accused and which might reasonably be considered capable of undermining the case for the prosecution against the accused or of assisting the case for the accused, except if such disclosure undermines public interest.[2] Fairness ordinarily requires that any material held by the prosecution which weakens its case or strengthens that of the defendant, if not relied on as part of its formal case against the defendant, should be disclosed to the defence.[3] The duty of disclosure under common law contemplates disclosure of anything which might assist the defence[4], even if such material was not to be used as evidence[5]. Under Indian criminal jurisprudence, which has borrowed liberally from common law, the duty of disclosure is embodied in sections 170(2), 173, 207 and 208 of the Code, which entail the forwarding of material to the Court and supply of copies thereof to the accused, subject to statutory exceptions.
II. Challenges in Enforcement
The right to disclosure is a salient feature of criminal justice, but its provenance and significance appear to be lost on the Indian criminal justice system. The woes of investigative bias and prosecutorial misconduct threaten to render this right otiose. That is not to say that the right of an accused to disclosure is indefeasible, as certain exceptions are cast in the Code itself, chief among them being public interest immunity under section 173(6). However, it is the mischief of the concept of ‘relied upon’ emerging from section 173(5) of the Code, which is wreaking havoc on the right to disclosure and is the central focus of this article. The rampant misuse of the words “on which the prosecution proposes to rely’ appearing in section 173(5) of the Code, to suppress material favourable to the accused or unfavourable to the prosecution in the garb of ‘un-relied documents’ has clogged criminal courts with avoidable litigation at the very nascent stage of supply of copies of documents under section 207 of the Code. The erosion of the right of an accused to disclosure through such subterfuge is exacerbated by the limited and restrictive validation of this right by criminal Courts. The dominant issues highlighted in the article, which stifle the right to disclosure are; tainted investigation, unscrupulous withholding of material beneficial to the accused by the prosecution, narrow interpretation by Courts of section 207 of the Code, and denial of the right to an accused to bring material on record in the pre-charge stage.
A. Tainted Investigation
Fair investigation is concomitant to the preservation of the right to fair disclosure and fair trial. It envisages collection of all material, irrespective of its inculpatory or exculpatory nature. However, investigation is often vitiated by the tendencies of overzealous investigating officers who detract from the ultimate objective of unearthing truth, with the aim of establishing guilt. Such proclivities result in collecting only incriminating material during investigation or ignoring the material favourable to the accused. This leads to suppression of material and scuttles the right of the accused to disclosure at the very inception. A tainted investigation leads to miscarriage of justice. Fortunately, the Courts are not bereft of power to supervise investigation and ensure that the right of an accused to fair disclosure remains protected. The Magistrate is conferred with wide amplitude of powers under section 156(3) of the Code to monitor investigation, and inheres all such powers which are incidental or implied to ensure proper investigation. This power can be exercised suo moto by the Magistrate at all stages of a criminal proceeding prior to the commencement of trial, so that an innocent person is not wrongly arraigned or a prima facie guilty person is not left out.[6]
B. Suppression of Material
Indian courts commonly witness that the prosecution is partisan while conducting the trial and is invariably driven by the lust for concluding in conviction. Such predisposition impels the prosecution to take advantage by selectively picking up words from the Code and excluding material favouring the accused or negating the prosecution case, with the aid of the concept of ‘relied upon’ within section 173(5) of the Code. However, the power of the prosecution to withhold material is not unbridled as the Constitutional mandate and statutory rights given to an accused place an implied obligation on the prosecution to make fair disclosure.[7] If the prosecution withholds vital evidence from the Court, it is liable to adverse inference flowing from section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (“Evidence Act). The prosecutor is expected to be guided by the Bar Council of India Rules which prescribe that an advocate appearing for the prosecution of a criminal trial shall so conduct the prosecution that it does not lead to conviction of the innocent. The suppression of material capable of establishment of the innocence of the accused shall be scrupulously avoided. [8]
C. Scope of S. 207
The scope of disclosure under section 207 has been the subject of fierce challenge in Indian Courts on account of the prosecution selectively supplying documents under the garb of ‘relied upon’ documents, to the prejudice of the defence of an accused. The earlier judicial trend had been to limit the supply of documents under section 207 of the Code to only those documents which were proposed to be relied upon by the prosecution. This view acquiesced the exclusion of documents which were seized during investigation, but not filed before the Court along with the charge sheet, rendering the right to disclosure a farce. This restrictive sweep fails to reconcile with the objective of a fair trial viz. discovery of truth. The scheme of the code discloses that Courts have been vested with extensive powers inter alia under sections 91, 156(3) and 311 to elicit the truth. Towards the same end, Courts are also empowered under Section 165 of the Evidence Act. Thus, the principle of harmonious construction warrants a more purposive interpretation of section 207 of the code. The Hon’ble Supreme Court expounded on the scope of Section 207 of the Code in the case of Manu Sharma[9] and held that documents submitted to the Magistrate under section 173(5) would deem to include the documents which have to be sent to the magistrate during the course of investigation under section 170(2). A document which has been obtained bona fide and has a bearing on the case of the prosecution should be disclosed to the accused and furnished to him to enable him to prepare a fair defence, particularly when non production or disclosure would affect administration of justice or prejudice the defence of the accused. It is not for the prosecution or the court to comprehend the prejudice that is likely to be caused to the accused. The perception of prejudice is for the accused to develop on reasonable basis.[10] Manu Sharma’s [supra] case has been relied upon in Sasikala [11] wherein it was held that the Court must concede a right to the accused to have access to the documents which were forwarded to the Court but not exhibited by the prosecution as they favoured the accused. These judgments seem more in consonance with the true spirit of fair disclosure and fair trial. However, despite such clear statements of law, courts are grappling with the judicial propensity of deviating from this expansive interpretation and regressing to the concept of relied upon. The same is evident from a recent pronouncement of the Delhi High Court where the ratios laid down in Manu Sharma & Sasikala [supra] were not followed by erroneously distinguishing from those cases.[12] Such “per incuriam” aberrations by High Court not only undermine the supremacy of the Apex Court, but also adversely impact the functioning of the district courts over which they exercise supervisory jurisdiction. Hopefully in future Judges shall be more circumspect and strictly follow the law declared by the Apex Court.
D. Pre-Charge Embargo
Another obstacle encountered in the enforcement of the right to disclosure is the earlier judicial approach to stave off production or consideration of any additional documents not filed alongwith the charge sheet at the pre-charge stage, as the right to file such material was available to the accused only upon the commencement of trial after framing of charge.[13] At the pre-charge stage, Court could not direct the prosecution to furnish copies of other documents[14] It was for the accused to do so during trial or at the time of entering his defence. However, the evolution of law has seen that at the stage of framing charge, Courts can rely upon the material which has been withheld by the prosecutor, even if such material is not part of the charge sheet, but is of such sterling quality demolishing the case of the prosecution.[15] Courts are not handicapped to consider relevant material at the stage of framing charge, which is not relied upon by the prosecution. It is no argument that the accused can ask for the documents withheld at the time of entering his defence.[16] The framing of charge is a serious matter in a criminal trial as it ordains an accused to face a long and arduous trial affecting his liberty. Therefore, the Court must have all relevant material before the stage of framing charge to ascertain if grave suspicion is made out or not. Full disclosure at the stage of section 207 of the code, which immediately precedes discharging or charging an accused, enables an accused to seek a discharge, if the documents, including those not relied upon by the prosecution, create an equally possible view in favour of the accused.[17] On the other hand, delaying the reception of documents postpones the vindication of the accused in an unworthy trial and causes injustice by subjecting him to the trauma of trial. There is no gainsaying that justice delayed is justice denied, therefore, such an approach ought not to receive judicial consent. A timely discharge also travels a long way in saving precious time of the judiciary, which is already overburdened by the burgeoning pendency of cases. Thus, delayed or piecemeal disclosure not only prejudices the defence of the accused, but also protracts the trial and occasions travesty of justice.
III. Duties of the stakeholders in criminal justice system
The foregoing analysis reveals that participation of the investigating agency, the prosecution and the Court is inextricably linked to the enforcement of the right to disclosure. The duties cast on these three stakeholders in the criminal justice system, are critical to the protection of this right. It is incumbent upon the investigating agencies to investigate cases fairly and to place on record all the material irrespective of its implication on the case of prosecution case. Investigation must be carried out with equal alacrity and fairness irrespective of status of accused or complainant.[18] An onerous duty is cast on the prosecution as an independent statutory officer, to conduct the trial with the objective of determination of truth and to ensure that material favourable to the defence is supplied to the accused. Ultimately, it is the overarching duty of the Court to ensure a fair trial towards the administration of justice for all parties. The principles of fair trial require the Court to strike a delicate balance between competing interests in a system of adversarial advocacy. Therefore, the court ought to exercise its power under section 156(3) of the Code to monitor investigation and ensure that all material, including that which enures to the benefit of the accused, is brought on record. Even at the stage of supply of copies of police report and documents under section 207 of the Code, it is the duty of the Court to give effect to the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Manu Sharma (supra) and Sasikala (supra), and ensure that all such material is supplied to the accused irrespective of whether it is “relied upon” by the prosecution or not.
IV. Alternate Remedy
The conundrum of supply of copies under section 207 of the code abounds criminal trials. Fairness is an evolving concept. There is no doubt that disclosure of all material which goes to establish the innocence of an accused is the sine qua non of a fair trial.[19] Effort is evidently underway to expand the concept in alignment with English jurisprudence. In the meanwhile, does the right of an accused to disclosure have another limb to stand on? Section 91 of the Code comes to the rescue of an accused, which confers wide discretionary powers on the Court, independent of section 173 of the Code, to summon the production of things or documents, relevant for the just adjudication of the case. In case the Court is of the opinion that the prosecution has withheld vital, relevant and admissible evidence from the Court, it can legitimately use its power under section 91 of the Code to discover the truth and to do complete justice to the accused.[20]
V. Conclusion
A society’s progress and advancement are judged on many parameters, an important one among them being the manner in which it administers criminal justice. Conversely, the ironic sacrilege of the core virtues of criminal jurisprudence in the temples of justice evinces social decadence. The Indian legislature of the twenty first century has given birth to several draconian statutes which place iron shackles on personal liberty, evoking widespread fear of police abuses and malicious prosecution. These statutes not only entail presumptions which reverse the burden of proof, but also include impediments to the grant of bail. Thus, a very heavy burden to dislodge the prosecution case is imposed on the accused, rendering the right to disclosure of paramount importance. It is the duty of the Court to keep vigil over this Constitutional and statutory right conferred on an accused by repudiating any procedure which prejudices his defence. Notable advancement has been made by the Apex Court in interpreting section 207 of the Code in conformity with the Constitutional mandate, including the right to disclosure. Strict adherence to the afore-noted principles will go a long way in ensuring real and substantial justice. Any departure will not only lead to judicial anarchy, but also further diminish the already dwindling faith of the public in the justice delivery system.
**
Advocate Manu Sharma has been practising at the bar for over sixteen years. He specialises in Criminal Defence. Some of the high profile cases he has represented are – the 2G scam case for former Union minister A Raja; the Religare/Fortis case for Malvinder Singh; Peter Mukerjee in the P Chidambaram/ INX Media case; Devas Multimedia in ISRO corruption act case; Om Prakash Chautala in PMLA case; Aditya Talwar in the aviation scam case; Dilip Ray, former Coal Minister in one of the coal scam cases; Suhaib Illyasi case.
**
Disclaimer: The views or opinions expressed are solely of the author.
[1] Maneka Gandhi and Another v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248
[2] S. 3 of the Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996
[3] R v. H and R v. C, 2004 (1) ALL ER 1269
[4] R v. Ward (Judith), (1993) 1 WLR 619 : (1993) 2 ALL ER 577 (CA)
[5] R v. Preston, (1994) 2 AC 130 : (1993) 3 WLR 891 : (1993) 4 ALL ER 638 (HL), R v. Stinchcome,
(1991), 68 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.)
[6] Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya and Others v. State of Gujarat and Another, 2019 SCC Online SC 1346
[7] Sidhartha Vashishth alias Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 6 SCC 1
[8] R. 16, part II, Ch. VI of the Bar Council of India Rules
[9] Manu Sharma, (2010) 6 SCC 1
[10] V.K. Sasikala v. State, (2012) 9 SCC 771 : AIR 2013 SC 613
[11] Sasikala, (2012) 9 SCC 771 : AIR 2013 SC 613
[12] Sala Gupta and Another v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2019) 262 DLT 661
[13] State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi¸(2005) 1 SCC 568
[14] Dharambir v. Central Bureau of Investigation, ILR (2008) 2 Del 842 : (2008) 148 DLT 289
[15] Nitya Dharmananda alias K. Lenin and Another v. Gopal Sheelum Reddy, (2018) 2 SCC 93
[16] Neelesh Jain v. State of Rajasthan, 2006 Cri LJ 2151
[17] Dilwar Balu Kurane v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 2 SCC 135, Yogesh alias Sachin Jagdish Joshi v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 10 SCC 394
[18] Karan Singh v. State of Haryana, (2013) 12 SCC 529
[19] Kanwar Jagat Singh v. Directorate of Enforcement & Anr, (2007) 142 DLT 49
[20] Neelesh, 2006 Cri LJ 2151
Disclaimer: The views or opinions expressed are solely of the author.
Validity & Existence of an Arbitration Clause in an Unstamped Agreement
By Kunal Kumar
January 8, 2024
In a recent ruling, a seven-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India in its judgment in re: Interplay between arbitration agreements under the Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996 and the Indian Stamp Act 1899, overruled the constitutional bench decision of the Supreme Court of India in N. N. Mercantile Private Limited v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. & Ors. and has settled the issue concerning the validity and existence of an arbitration clause in an unstamped agreement. (‘N. N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. – III’)
Background to N. N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. – III
One of the first instances concerning the issue of the validity of an unstamped agreement arose in the case of SMS Tea Estate Pvt. Ltd. v. Chandmari Tea Company Pvt. Ltd. In this case, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that if an instrument/document lacks proper stamping, the exercising Court must preclude itself from acting upon it, including the arbitration clause. It further emphasized that it is imperative for the Court to impound such documents/instruments and must accordingly adhere to the prescribed procedure outlined in the Indian Stamp Act 1899.
With the introduction of the 2015 Amendment, Section 11(6A) was inserted in the Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996 (A&C Act) which stated whilst appointing an arbitrator under the A&C Act, the Court must confine itself to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement.
In the case of M/s Duro Felguera S.A. v. M/s Gangavaram Port Limited, the Supreme Court of India made a noteworthy observation, affirming that the legislative intent behind the 2015 Amendment to the A&C Act was necessitated to minimise the Court's involvement during the stage of appointing an arbitrator and that the purpose embodied in Section 11(6A) of A&C Act, deserves due acknowledgement & respect.
In the case of Garware Wall Ropes Ltd. v. Cosatal Marine Constructions & Engineering Ltd., a divisional bench of the Apex Court reaffirmed its previous decision held in SMS Tea Estates (supra) and concluded that the inclusion of an arbitration clause in a contract assumes significance, emphasizing that the agreement transforms into a contract only when it holds legal enforceability. The Apex Court observed that an agreement fails to attain the status of a contract and would not be legally enforceable unless it bears the requisite stamp as mandated under the Indian Stamp Act 1899. Accordingly, the Court concluded that Section 11(6A) read in conjunction with Section 7(2) of the A&C Act and Section 2(h) of the Indian Contract Act 1872, clarified that the existence of an arbitration clause within an agreement is contingent on its legal enforceability and that the 2015 Amendment of the A&C Act to Section 11(6A) had not altered the principles laid out in SMS Tea Estates (supra).
Brief Factual Matrix – N. N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd.
Indo Unique Flame Ltd. (‘Indo Unique’) was awarded a contract for a coal beneficiation/washing project with Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. (‘KPCL’). In the course of the project, Indo Unique entered into a subcontract in the form of a Work Order with N.N. Global Mercantile Pvt. Ltd. (‘N.N. Global’) for coal transportation, coal handling and loading. Subsequently, certain disputes arose with KPCL, leading to KPCL invoking Bank Guarantees of Indo Unique under the main contract, after which Indo Unique invoked the Bank Guarantee of N. N. Global as supplied under the Work Order.
Top of FormS
Subsequently, N.N. Global initiated legal proceedings against the cashing of the Bank Guarantee in a Commercial Court. In response thereto, Indo Unique moved an application under Section 8 of the A&C Act, requesting that the Parties to the dispute be referred for arbitration. The Commercial Court dismissed the Section 8 application, citing the unstamped status of the Work Order as one of the grounds. Dissatisfied with the Commercial Court's decision on 18 January 2018, Indo Unique filed a Writ Petition before the High Court of Bombay seeking that the Order passed by the Commercial Court be quashed or set aside. The Hon’ble Bombay High Court on 30 September 2020 allowed the Writ Petition filed by Indo Unique, aggrieved by which, N.N. Global filed a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court of India.
N. N. Global Mercantile Pvt. Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. – I
The issue in the matter of M/s N.N. Global Mercantile Pvt. Ltd. v. M/s Indo Unqiue Flame Ltd. & Ors. came up before a three-bench of the Supreme Court of India i.e. in a situation when an underlying contract is not stamped or is insufficiently stamped, as required under the Indian Stamp Act 1899, would that also render the arbitration clause as non-existent and/or unenforceable (‘N.N. Global Mercantile Pvt. Ltd. v. Indo Flame Ltd. – I’).
The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India whilst emphasizing the 'Doctrine of Separability' of an arbitration agreement held that the non-payment of stamp duty on the commercial contract would not invalidate, vitiate, or render the arbitration clause as unenforceable, because the arbitration agreement is considered an independent contract from the main contract, and the existence and/or validity of an arbitration clause is not conditional on the stamping of a contract. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that deficiency in stamp duty of a contract is a curable defect and that the deficiency in stamp duty on the work order, would not affect the validity and/or enforceability of the arbitration clause, thus applying the Doctrine of Separability. The arbitration agreement remains valid and enforceable even if the main contract, within which it is embedded, is not admissible in evidence owing to lack of stamping.
The Hon’ble Apex Court, however, considered it appropriate to refer the issue i.e. whether unstamped instrument/document, would also render an arbitration clause as non-existent, unenforceable, to a constitutional bench of five-bench of the Supreme Court.
N. N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. – II
On 25 April 2023, a five-judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the matter of N. N. Mercantile Private Limited v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. & Ors. held that (1) An unstamped instrument containing an arbitration agreement cannot be said to be a contract which is enforceable in law within the meaning of Section 2(h) of the Indian Contract Act 1872 and would be void under Section 2(g) of the Indian Contract Act 1872, (2) an unstamped instrument which is not a contract nor enforceable cannot be acted upon unless it is duly stamped, and would not otherwise exist in the eyes of the law, (3) the certified copy of the arbitration agreement produced before a Court, must clearly indicate the stamp duty paid on the instrument, (4) the Court exercising its power in appointing an arbitration under Section 11 of the A&C Act, is required to act in terms of Section 33 and Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act 1899 (N. N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. – II).
N. N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. – III
A seven-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India on 13 December 2023 in its recent judgment in re: Interplay between arbitration agreements under the Arbitration & Conciliation Act 1996 and the Indian Stamp Act 1899, (1) Agreements lacking proper stamping or inadequately stamped are deemed inadmissible as evidence under Section 35 of the Stamp Act. However, such agreements are not automatically rendered void or unenforceable ab initio; (2) non-stamping or insufficient stamping of a contract is a curable defect, (2) the issue of stamping is not subject to determination under Sections 8 or 11 of the A&C Act by a Court. The concerned Court is only required to assess the prima facie existence of the arbitration agreement, separate from concerns related to stamping, and (3) any objections pertaining to the stamping of the agreement would fall within the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal. Accordingly, the decision in N. N. Global Mercantile (P) Ltd. v. Indo Unique Flame Ltd. – II and SMS Tea (supra) was overruled, by the seven-judge bench of the Supreme Court of India.
Kunal is a qualified lawyer with more than nine years of experience and has completed his LL.M. in Dispute Resolution (specialisation in International Commercial Arbitration) from Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution, Pepperdine University, California.
Kunal currently has his own independent practice and specializes in commercial/construction arbitration as well as civil litigation. He has handled several matters relating to Civil Law and arbitrations (both domestic and international) and has appeared before the Supreme Court of India, High Court of Delhi, District Courts of Delhi and various other tribunals.
No Safe Harbour For Google On Trademark Infringement
By Mayank Grover & Pratibha Vyas
October 9, 2023
Innovation, patience, dedication and uniqueness culminate in establishing a distinct identity. A trademark aids in identifying the source and quality, shaping perceptions about the identity's essence. When values accompany a product or service's trademark, safeguarding against misuse and infringement becomes crucial. A recent pronouncement of a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court dated August 10, 2023 in Google LLC v. DRS Logistics (P) Ltd. & Ors. and Google India Private Limited v. DRS Logistics (P) Ltd. & Ors. directed that Google’s use of trademarks as keywords for its Google Ads Programme does amount to ‘use’ in advertising under the Trademarks Act and the benefit of safe harbour would not be available to Google if such keywords infringe on the concerned trademark.
Factual Background
Google LLC manages and operates the Google Search Engine and Ads Programme, while, Google India Private Limited is a subsidiary of Google that has been appointed as a non-exclusive reseller of the Ads Programme in India. The Respondents, DRS Logistics and Agarwal Packers and Movers Pvt. Ltd. are leading packaging, moving and logistics service providers in India.
On 22.12.2011, DRS filed a suit against Google and Just Dial Ltd. under provisions of the Trademarks Act, 1999 (‘TM Act’) inter alia seeking a permanent injunction against Google from permitting third parties from infringing, passing off etc. the relevant trademarks of DRS. The core of the dispute revolved around Google’s Ads Programme. DRS claimed that its trade name 'AGARWAL PACKERS AND MOVERS' is widely recognized and a 'well-known' trademark. Use of DRS’s trademark as a keyword diverts internet traffic from its website to that of its competitors and they were entitled to seek restraint against Google for permitting third parties who are not authorized to use the said trademark. DRS further argued that Google benefits from these trademark infringements. This practice involved charging a higher amount for displaying these ads, constituting an infringement of their trademarks. Whereas, Google contended that the use of the keyword in the Ads Programme does not amount to ‘use’ under the TM Act notwithstanding that the keyword is/or similar to a trademark. Thus, the use of a term as a keyword cannot be construed as an infringement of a trademark under the TM Act, and being an intermediary, it claimed a safe harbour under Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000. (‘IT Act’).
In essence, the dispute between the parties was rooted in DRS’s grievance concerning the Ads Programme. The Learned Single Judge vide judgment dated 30.10.2021interpreted relevant provisions of the TM Act and drew on multiple legal precedents to arrive at the decision that DRS can seek protection of its trademarks which were registered under Section 28 of the TM Act and issued directions to investigate complaints alleging the use of trademark and/or to ascertain whether a sponsored result has an effect of infringing a trademark or passing off.
Being aggrieved, Google LLC and Google Pvt. Ltd. filed appeals before the Division Bench. Google LLC argued that the Single Judge’s findings were erroneous and the directions issued were liable to be set aside. Google India claimed that it doesn’t control and operate the Search Engine and the Ads Programme making it unable to comply with the directions passed in the impugned judgment.
Analysis & Decision of Court
The Division Bench found Single Judge’s rationale for assessing trademark infringement through keywords and meta-tags valid. Meta-tags are a list of words/code in a website, not readily visible to the naked eye. It serves as a tool for indexing the website by a search engine. If a trademark of a third party is used as a meta-tag, the same would serve as identifying the website as relevant to the search query that includes the trademark as a search term. The use of keywords in the Ads Programme also serves similar purpose. The Division Bench was unable to accept that using a trademark as a keyword, even if not visible, would not be considered trademark use under the TM Act.
Google placed heavy reliance on the decisions rendered by Courts across jurisdictions of United Kingdom, United States of America, European Union, Australia, New Zealand, Russia, South Africa, Canada, Spain, Italy, Japan and China; in the cases of Google France SARL and Google Inc. v. Louis Vitton SA & Ors.[1], Interflora Inc. v. Marks & Spencer Plc.[2], and L’Oreal SA v. eBay International AG[3] in support of the contention that the use of trade marks is by the advertiser and not by Google. However, the Division Bench rejected Google’s passive role; highlighting its active involvement in recommending and promoting trademark keywords for higher clicks in its Ads Programme. Division Bench referred to a few judicial decisions rendered in the United States of America that captured the essence of the controversy for perspective, concluding that Google actively promotes and encourages trademarks associated with major goods and services, rather than having a passive role.
It was held that the contention that the use of trademarks as keywords, per se constitutes an infringement of the trademark is unmerited; the assumption that an internet user is merely searching the address of the proprietor of the trademark when he feeds in a search query that may contain a trademark, is erroneous.
The Doctrine of 'Initial Interest Confusion' addresses trademark infringement based on pre-purchase confusion. The doctrine is applied when meta-tags, keywords, or domain names cause initial confusion similar to a registered trademark. If users are misled to access unrelated websites, trademark use in internet advertising may be actionable and reliance was placed on US precedents. Referring to Section 29 of the TM Act, it was directed that Section 29 does not specify the duration for which the confusion lasts but, even if the confusion is for a short duration and an internet user is able to recover from the same, the trade mark would be infringed and would offend Section 29(2) of the TM Act.
It was held that the Ads Programme is a platform for displaying advertisements. Google, being an architect and operator of its own programme makes it an active participant in the use of trademarks and determining the advertisements displayed on search pages. Their use of proprietary software makes them utilize trademarks and control the distribution of information related to potentially infringing links, ultimately leading to revenue maximization. Hence, a substantial link exists between Google LLC and Google India, rendering it impossible for Google India to deny its role in operating the Ads Programme. It was further held that Google sells trademarks as keywords to advertisers and encourages users to use trademarks as keywords for ads. It is contradictory for Google to encourage trademark use while claiming data belongs to third parties for exemption. After 2004, Google changed policies to boost revenue and subsequently, introduced a tool that searches effective terms, including trademarks. Google's active involvement in its advertising business and online nature does not necessarily qualify it for benefits under Section 79 of the IT Act. The Division Bench agreed with the view of the Single Judge that Google would not be eligible for protection of safe harbour under Section 79(1) of the IT Act, if its alleged activities infringe trademarks.
Conclusion
This is a seminal decision governing (and rather, restricting) the operations of intermediaries and redefining the jurisprudence of safe harbour under the IT Act. The decision is well-reasoned and establishes a significant precedent for safeguarding trademarks by uniquely holding Google accountable under its Ads Programme. The same will prevent usage of tradenames as a third-party trademark in keyword search or metatags by advertisers on Google’s search engine. While keywords and meta-tags have different levels of visibility, their purpose is similar i.e. advertising and attracting internet traffic. The use of trademarks as meta-tags by a person who is neither a proprietor of the trademark nor permitted to use the same leads to confusion amongst public at large due to the automated processes of search engines and consequently, constitutes trademark infringement.
About the Authors: Mayank Grover is a Partner and Pratibha Vyas is an Associate at Seraphic Advisors, Advocates & Solicitors
[1] C-236/08 to C-238/08 (2010) [2011] All ER (EC) 41
[2] [2014] EWCA Civ 1403
[3] 2C- 324/09 (2010)
Legitquest is a Legal-Tech venture run by a versatile team of tech-savvy attorneys, engineers and designers who aim to make the practice of law simpler for its end users. We have eminent jurist Mr. Ram Jethmalani as our patron
