In Civil Appeal No. 7935 of 2023 -SC- Supreme Court affirms discretion to provide redress in unjust, unfair disciplinary proceedings; reinstates constable dismissed over date of birth alteration
Justice J.K. Maheshwari & Justice K.V. Viswanathan [04-12-2023]

Read Order: Ram Lal V. State of Rajasthan & Ors

Chahat Varma

New Delhi, December 5, 2023: The Supreme Court has reinstated a Rajasthan Armed Constabulary constable who was dismissed from service over allegations of altering his date of birth in official documents. The Court reasoned that if the evidence, witnesses, and circumstances were the same in both criminal and departmental proceedings, and the acquittal in the criminal case resulted from a full consideration of the evidence, the court could provide redress.

In the case at hand, Ram Lal, a Constable with the Rajasthan Armed Constabulary, 9th Battalion, Jodhpur, was involved in a legal dispute concerning the alteration of his date of birth in official documents. This alteration was alleged to have been made in his 8th standard marksheet, changing his birth year from 1974 to 1972, with the intention of misrepresenting his age during recruitment. Both criminal and departmental proceedings were initiated against Ram Lal, with the same allegations forming the basis of both cases. Although the trial Court convicted him under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and sentenced him to imprisonment and a fine, the Appellate Judge subsequently acquitted him in the criminal trial.

Post-acquittal, the appellant sought reinstatement, by filing a writ petition, to quash the dismissal order, the Appellate Authority's decision, and subsequent refusal to review. The Single Judge, dismissed the writ petition, emphasizing the differing standards of proof in criminal and departmental proceedings. The writ appeal met a similar fate, with the court reiterating the limited parameters for judicial review in departmental proceedings.

The division bench of Justice J.K. Maheshwari and Justice K.V. Viswanathan stated that it was conscious of the fact that the power of a writ court to review the order of the Disciplinary Authority was very limited. The scope of the inquiry was confined to examining whether the decision-making process was legitimate. The bench also remarked that it was also aware that the mere acquittal by a criminal court would not grant the employee the right to claim any benefits, including reinstatement.

However, the bench highlighted that if the evidence, witnesses, and circumstances are the same in both proceedings, the situation takes on a different character. In cases where the court in judicial review determines that the acquittal in the criminal proceeding resulted from a full consideration of the prosecution evidence, and the prosecution failed to prove the charge, the court, in certain circumstances, can provide redress. The court, in judicial review, retains the discretion to grant relief if it concludes that allowing the findings in the disciplinary proceedings to stand would be unjust, unfair, and oppressive.

The bench observed that it was well settled that if the findings of the disciplinary authorities were arrived at after ignoring the relevant material, the court in judicial review could interfere. The bench stated that they were satisfied that in the present case, the disciplinary proceedings were vitiated and deserved to be quashed.

In this context, the bench expressed inclination to accept the explanation given by the appellant that the overwriting in the application form was only due to the correction of an inadvertent error. The bench emphasized that as long as the original 8th standard marksheet reflected his date of birth as 21.04.1972, without any correction or manipulation, the appellant could not be penalized.

The bench further stated that it was crucial to recognize that the Appellate Judge had explicitly recorded that in the original marksheet of the 8th standard, the date of birth was clearly stated as 21.04.1972. The other documents presented by the prosecution were either letters or a duplicate marksheet. Although the Appellate Judge expressed doubt about whether the date of birth was 21.04.1974 and acknowledged that the accused might be entitled to the benefit of doubt, the bench highlighted the importance of focusing on the substance of the judgment. The bench clarified that a comprehensive reading of the entire judgment unmistakably indicated that the appellant was acquitted after a thorough examination of the prosecution evidence and a recognition that the prosecution had failed to prove the charge. The emphasis was on examining the substance of the judgment rather than dwelling solely on the expressions used.

The bench held that the findings of the appellate judge in the criminal case clearly indicated that the charge against the appellant was not just ‘not proved’, but in fact, the charge even stood ‘disproved’ by the prosecution evidence. The bench emphasized the distinction between a fact being ‘disproved’ and ‘not proved’, citing the decision in Vijayee Singh and Others v. State of U.P. [LQ/SC/1990/266]. According to this decision, a fact is considered ‘disproved’ when the court, after considering the evidence before it, believes that the fact does not exist or considers its non-existence so probable that a prudent person ought to act upon the supposition that it does not exist. On the other hand, a fact is deemed ‘not proved’ when it is neither ‘proved’ nor ‘disproved’.

The bench stated that the charges brought against the appellant in both the criminal trial and the departmental inquiry were not just similar, but identical. In light of this observation, the bench opined that the disciplinary proceedings and the orders passed thereon could not be allowed to stand. Thus, the bench exercised its discretion to quash the orders of the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority, reasoning that allowing these orders to stand would be unjust, unfair, and oppressive in this particular case.

Thus, the Court declared the order of termination, the order of the Appellate Authority, and the subsequent orders, which refused to reconsider and review the penalty, as illegal and untenable.

Consequently, the appellant, was reinstated with all consequential benefits, including seniority, notional promotions, fitment of salary, and all other benefits. The Court also awarded the appellant 50% of the backwages.